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Offshore drillers focus on wrong safety data, says US chem safety board

07.23.2012  | 

Offshore oil and gas drillers put too much emphasis on items such as individual worker injuries while neglecting better indicators of danger, such as the number of near-misses a drilling rig experiences or whether safety equipment are maintained on schedule, according to the CSB's preliminary findings.

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By TOM FOWLER

HOUSTON -- A federal safety agency has determined that the offshore-drilling industry is relying on the wrong data in its quest to prevent major accidents like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout.

Offshore oil and gas drillers put too much emphasis on items such as individual worker injuries while neglecting better indicators of danger, such as the number of near-misses a drilling rig experiences or whether safety equipment are maintained on schedule, according to preliminary findings of the US Chemical Safety Board's investigation of the Deepwater Horizon incident.

"Personal-injury data can give a misleading picture of the safety of an operation since those accidents typically don't correspond to major accidents," said Don Holmstrom, the agency's lead investigator.

"Areas such as incident investigation, change management and equipment maintenance need to be a focus over and above personal injury and prevention."

The agency's verdict is part of a wide response among US regulators to the blast in April 2010 that sank a Transocean drilling rig leased by BP in the US Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 and unleashing the worst offshore oil spill in US history.

The CSB typically investigates accidents at chemical plants and refineries, but a Congressional committee asked it to compare the Deepwater Horizon disaster to the lethal 2005 explosion at BP's Texas City refinery.

The CSB's safety investigation on the Texas City incident led to widespread changes in petrochemical industrial processes.

Some in the offshore industry have resisted the agency's efforts, saying it lacks jurisdiction over offshore matters. Transocean is fighting subpoenas by the CSB to interview its employees, an issue that is pending before a federal judge in Houston.

In its report and in papers to be presented by experts during two days of conferences starting Monday in Houston, the CSB said that the offshore-energy business in the US has not done nearly enough to bring its operating procedures up to par with those found in the North Sea and other offshore-exploration areas.

US regulators don't require companies to report all incidents that lead to the release of oil or gas, and also don't require the reporting of "kicks," instances where there's a significant surge in pressure from a well that could lead to a blowout, according to a paper by Andrew Hopkins, a professor at the Australian National University.

But regulators in Norway and Australia require all hydrocarbon releases, even small ones, to be reported as well as all kicks.

Tracking such incidents, how quickly crews respond to them and whether companies keep key safety equipment maintained on schedule could give a better picture of how well prepared operators are to handle actual risks, according to Mr. Hopkins.

The industry's emphasis on personal injuries led Transocean to report 2010 as its best year ever for safety performance, based in large part on the number of incidents it was required to report to regulators for every 200,000 employee hours worked.

The company issued large bonuses to top executives because of the safety performance figures but later donated the bonus money to a fund for the families of victims of the Deepwater Horizon blast.

public_hearing.jpg After the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, the US energy industry created the Center for Offshore Safety to develop new standards for offshore exploration and production.

The center's director, Charlie Williams, is expected to testify about the group's work on Tuesday.

The CSB will release specific safety recommendations for equipment related to the accident, including the blowout preventer, later this year.

The blowout preventer is a valve that controls the flow of oil and gas out of a submarine well; it failed during the Deepwater Horizon incident.

Dow Jones Newswires



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Zia
08.01.2012

Maintenance and number of services of the equipments should be arranged as per the area atmosphere where those are being used. This prevents lot from the equipment fails.

Russell Hollamby
07.25.2012

Bhopal (Chemical sector)
Exxon Valdez (Shipping sector)
Piper Alpha (Production sector)
Texas City (Processing sector)
Macondo (Drilling sector)
and the list goes on.

Common conclusion: Competence of People and Compliance with Procedures failure.
Common failure: embedded learning from mistakes, profit outweighing safety.
Repeated error: lack of focus on assuring 'real' competence: ability to demonstrate safe, repeated, consistent performance to the required minimum standard. "They attended the training course, they are competent"!
Mis-direction: Bonuses for achieving xxxxxxx hours without loss-time injury; and therefore applying unrealistic pressure on people to not report near misses and minor injuries (only first aid case!).

When we each of us learn - it's our life that is at risk, not the manager's!!!

Bhadresh
07.24.2012

Safety culture is more important. Company spends lot of money in design and providing safety systems, but in operation and maintenance it is bypassed, over looked and not funded for maintenance, checks and calibration. This behaviour is responsible for all accidents.

Steve
07.24.2012

After 30 years in the O&G industry. 10 on drilling rig as a welder and the rest in various other areas as supervisor and HSE/ER coordinator and OIM. I have now came back to working with US drilling rigs as HSE etc. The old attitude is still there and old ideas and rigs. No improvement has taken place as it has in other sectors. PTW is pathetic lip service. We are in the middle east with a major US drilling Co. They are years behind the work we have been carrying out in Kazakhstan and their only nod to HSE is employing a 3rd world HSE advisor. (useless). STOP cards and injuries as a measure of how good they are. Emergency response readiness is archaic. Rig too old, too small and needs major modernisation or scrapped. But good enough for here. Nowhere near the North sea or even Kazakhstan. They depend on nothing going wrong as ER protection, not their reaction. (just a quick note). They have a lot to learn.

Ibrahim Arif
07.24.2012

Injuries or Safe Working Man-hours are misleading indicators and at times persons are prompted not to report injury incident just to protect the safety records. In my view, this should be totally disregarded and industry must focus on input safety measures e.g. Number of Risk Assessments / JSA carried out, or man-hours HSE Training imparted, %age completion of audit actions and performance evaluation criteria should be changed accordingly.

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